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WHY DOES HIGH INFLATION RAISE INFLATION UNCERTAINTY?
A5STRACT
This paper presents a model of monetary policy in which a rise in
inflation raises uncertainty about future inflation.When inflation is low,
there is a consensus that the monetary authority will try to keep it low.When
inflation is high, policyniakers face a dilemma:they would like to disinflate,
but fear the recession that would result.The public does not know the tastes




Princeton, NJ 08544-1017Economists frequently argue that a rise in current inflation leads to
greater uncertainty about future inflation.This idea is a central theme, for
example, in Okun's (1971)'The Mirage of Steady Inflation' and in Friedman's
(1977) Nobel Lecture.Many empirical studies provide evidence of suchan
effect.But the accompanying explanations for the effect are usually loose
(Okun, for example, uses an analogy to driving over a bumpy road).It
appears that economists find the inflation level-uncertainty relation plausible
but have trouble pinning down why.This paper attempts to improve our
understanding of this relation by presenting a model that predicts it.'
The idea behind the model is simple: high inflation creates uncertainty
about future monetary policy.To understand why, consider first a period of
low inflation, such as the early 60s in the United States.In this situation, it
is a good bet that the Fed is happy with the status quo and will attempt to
prolong it. Inflation may rise at some point for a reason exogenous to the
Fed, such as spending on Viet Nam.It is unlikely, however, that the Fed
will simply decide that it is desirable to inflate.
Contrast this situation with a time of high inflation, such as the late
70s.Now it is not obvious what the Fed will do, because it faces a dilemma:
it would like to disinflate but fears the recession that would probably
result.It is likely that disinflation will occur eventually, but the timing is
uncertain.It depends on factors that are difficult to gauge in advance, such
as the values and opinions of FOMC members and the political pressures that
they face.In the late 70s, it would have been difficult to predict that sharp
disinflation would arrive in 1981_82.2
These ideas are similar to some previous discussions of inflation
uncertainty.Logue and Willet (1976) argue that "at higher average rates [of
inflation] government financial policy will tend to be less stable as it tries to
1bring inflation under control while avoiding steep recession."Fischer and
Modigliani (1978) suggest that "governments typically announce unrealistic
stabilization programs as the inflation rate rises, thus increasing uncertainty
about what the actual path of prices will be.'And Friedman argues that'[a)
burst of inflation produces strong pressure to counter it. Policy goes from
one direction to the other, encouraging wide variation in,.. inflation."The
common theme is that high inflation creates uncertainty about how policy will
respond,
This paper formalizes this idea by applying recent advances in the
positive theory of monetary policy,Specifically, I make two modifications to
Barro and Gordon's (1983b) model of the repeated game between the Fed and
the public.First, following Canzoneri (1985), I introduce exogenous shocks
that cause low—inflation equilibria to break down occasionally.The economy
alternates between periods of high and low inflation, and I can compare
uncertainty in the two situations.Second, following Alesina (1987), I capture
policy uncertainty by assuming that there are two policymakers who alternate
in power stochastically.The conservative policymaker (C) views inflation as
very costly relative to unemployment, while the liberal (L) views inflation as
less costly. (As described below, a switch in policymakers is interpreted
broadly as a regime change that need not involve new personnel.)
These assumptions lead naturally to a link between inflation and
uncertainty.C hates inflation, so when inflation is low he tries to keep it
low and when it is high he disinflates.L also tries to prolong low inflation
--thatis, he resists the temptation to create an inflationary boom--buthe
is not willing to create a recession to disinflate.L's behavior results from a
crucial asymmetry: as explained below, the welfare gain froma boom is
smaller than the cost of a recession.When inflation is low, the public is
2certain of future policy because C and L do the same thing.High inflation
creates uncertainty because the policymakers respond differently to the
disinflation dilemma and the public does not know who will be in charge.
There are two versions of my model.In the first, as in previous work,
policymakers attach a cost to the level of inflation.While this specification is
plausible, the subject of the paper suggests an alternative.The
inflation-uncertainty link is important because it helps to explain why
inflation is costly: economists often argue that inflation has small costs ifit
is perfectly anticipated but larger costs ifit raises uncertainty.Motivated
by this view, the second model includes a cost of uncertainty as well as a
smaller coat that depends on the inflation level.This specification creates a
paradox: conservatives view inflation as costly because it creates uncertainty,
but uncertainty arises from their efforts to disinflate (along with liberals'
resistance).It appears that conservatives would do better by accepting high
inflation.I show, however, that this may not be true.
The rest of the paper contains five sections.Section II presents the
basic model.Section III describes behavior that produces an
inflation—uncertainty link, and Section IV determines when this behavior is an
equilibrium.Section V considers the model with a coat of uncertainty, and
Section VI concludes.
II.THE MODEL
The modal combines elements of Barro—Gordon (1983a,b), Canzoneri (1985),




30. where Z. is policymaker 1S lossin period t, U is actual unemployment, Uis
optimal unemployment (a constant), n is inflation, and a is a taste parameter.
C views inflation as more costly relative to unemployment than L does.
The policymakers face a short run Phillips curve:
(2)Ut — — "V
U0+1
whereuNisthe natural rate of unemployment arxiis expected inflation
at t given information at t-1.As in previous work,uN>U0createsthe
time-consistency problem that leads to inflation.(The as&sptions that
and that the coefficient on 7.T_fle equals one are normalizations on
the units of U and it.)Substituting(2) into (1) yields the loss in terms of
actual and unexpected inflation:
(3)Z, —
—1)2+
Thepolicymakers gain and lose power stochastically.For simplicity, the
probability that C is in power in a given period is a constant, c.L is in
power with probability 1—c.One can interpret a change of policymakers as
an election or appointment of a new Fed chairman.But it is more realistic to
interpret it broadly as a policy shift, probably resulting from an FOMC
meeting, that does not require new personnel.For example, the Fed may
first act liberal, tolerating high inflation, but then crack down because it
decides that the problem is serious or succumbs to political pressure.3
As in Canzoneri, the Fed does not control inflation perfectly. This
assumption is needed for high inflation to arise occasionally, since (in the
equilibrium below) policymakers never inflate on purpose.Each period, the
policymaker in power chooses a target inflation rate ii.Withprobability q, a
shock causes actual inflation to deviate from the target.That is,
4with probability l—q
Tr+ withprobability q
Theshock tisdistributed symmetrically aroundzero,with greatest density
at zero.The public does not observe t,soit cannot tell whether a rise in
inflation is intentional.One should think of q as fairly small: a shock is an
occasional event, such as a significant shift in the money demand function.
(The role of this assumption is explained below.)4
The two policymakere play a simple repeated game.At the start of each
period, the public sets expected inflation; expectations are assumed to be
rational.Then the current policymaker is determined and he choosesthe
target i.Finally,the inflation shock (ifany)arrives, determining actual
inflation.In choosing n,thepolicyinaker in power minimizes the expected
present value of his loss, with discount factor fi,puttingequal weight on
periods when he is in and out of power.Each policymaker takes the other's
behavior as given.
III.A PROPOSED EQUILIBRIUM
This section and the next show how the model can produce a positive
relation between inflation and uncertainty.This section describes behavior
by the two policymakers that implies such a relation.The next section
determines when this behavior is an equilibrium and discusses other possible
equilibria.
The proposed equilibrium is presented in Table I.It is a modification of
the equilibrium for one policymaker in Barro—Gordon (1983b) and Canzoneri
(1985).Expected inflation and the policymakers' inflation targets depend on
inflationin the previous period.Ifpreviousinflation was non—positive, then
5expected inflation is zero and both policymakers target zero.If previous
inflation was positive, then expected inflation is positive.Inthis
situation,C still targets zero butL targets>O (the value of is
determined below).Since L is in power with probability 1-c, rational
expectations implies Intuitively,when expected inflationis
zero, both policymakers are deterred from inflating by the 'punishment" of
higher expected inflation in the next period.When expected inflation is
positive,C disinflates but L does not, because he is not willing to create a
recession.
Over time, the economy alternates between periods of high (positive) and
low (non—positive) inflation.Policymakers try to prolong low inflation, but at
some point a shock causes inflation to rise, and expected inflation rises in
the following period.Inflation remains high as long as L is in power but
returns to zero when C arrives.(In general, inflation could also return to
zero through a large negative shock, but this is ruled outbelow.)5
As in Canzoneri, a rise in inflation caused by a shock must raise
expected inflation because the shock is unobservable.If the public,
believing that the rise is accidental, continues to expect low inflation -—that
is,if there is no punishment --thenthe Fed can gain by faking positive
shocks.Thus it cannot be an equilibrium for expected inflation to stay low.
(The public does ignore negative shocks, because the Fed has no incentive to
cheat in that direction.)Note that the behavior of expectations is realistic:
when actual inflation rises or falls, expectations follow.
Table I implies a positive relation between current inflation and
uncertainty about next period's inflation.If t is non-positive, then next
period'starget, issure to be zero. i n is positive, then is
zerowith probability c andwith probability 1-c; its variance isc(l-c)2.
6In any period, the variance of unintentional inflation,7T7T*,isqo(the
probability of a shock times its variance).Combining these results, the
variance of next period's inflation is
(5)E[(n1 — qa2 for 0
2 —2
=qc+c(l-c) for >0
The uncertainty arising from inflation shocks is constant, but policy
uncertainty is greater at high inflation.
IV.WHEN IS IT AN EQUILIBRIUM?
This section derives conditions under which Table Iis a perfect Nash
equilibriun.There are a nunber of steps.Part A presents simplifying
aasunptions arid Part B detei:,n,ines r, L's inflation target when
Part C determines the present values of policymakers' losses when they
behave according to Table I.Part D computes the effects on these losses of
deviations from the assumed behavior; Table Iis a perfect Nash equilibrium if
neither policymaker benefits from any deviation.Part E discusses the
results, and Part F describes other possible equilibria.
A.Simplifying Assumptions
The behavior in Table I is simple; for example, ntakeson only two
valueg.To obtain this behavior, we must impose several restrictions on the
parameters.Relaxing these restrictions leads to more complicated but
qualitatively similar results.Here I present the simplifying assumptions and





where q is a complicated expression (see (A8) in the Appendix). Assumption
(6) limits the size of the inflation shock.It guarantees that inflation does
not fall to zero accidentally when policymakers target positive inflation.(7)
states that a shock is not too likely in a given period.As described below,
this simplifies policymakers' choices of targets.Finally, (8) bounds the
probability of a conservative policymaker (when the discount factoris close
to one, the bound is close to 1/2).If c is too large, then when is high
the iblic expects isinediate disinflation.But ifis low even when
is high, there is little deterrent to surprise inflation, and Table I cannot be
an equilibriun.6
B.Determination of n
HereI complete Table I by determining n,L's positive inflation target
when TheAppendix showsthatifpolicyineker i chooses a positive




ThisInflation rate minimizes the one—period loss (3) for given71.e
Intuitively, any i>O implies that next period's expected inflation is (l—c).
Since all i'>O have the same effect on future expectations, a pohcymaker
considers only his current loss in choosing among them.(In general, the
presere of inflation shocks could alter this result: a policyineker might
reduce his target below ,4toirxrease the probability of accidental
disinflation.The Appendix shows, howsver, that this complication is ruled
8out by assunptions (6)and(7).)
in Table I is given by (9) with iL.Combining this result with
the factthat ir(1-c)when yields
(10)n
C.Equilibrium Losses
Here I determine the expected present values of policymakers' losses
when they behave according to Table I.Consider first the loss in one
period.Equation (3) gives the loss in terms of expected and actual
inflation.Callthisexpression Z(ne, 7)LetZ.(n5, ,r*)denote the
expected lossgiven e, the target ire,andthe distribution of the inflation
shock.One can show that
(11)Z.(77e,7T*)Z.(ne, *)+q(a.+1)72
The first term on the right is the loss when n'r——thatis, when there is
no shock ——andthe second is the expected loss from shocks (shocks raise
the expected loss because Zis convex in n).
Thepresent values of the losses depend on the initial level of
inflation.Let V and v?bethe expected present values of i's loss at
the start of a period -—beforethe current policymaker is determined --
whenprevious inflation was positive and non—positive respectively.These
losses are defined implicitly by
(12)v? R° .,. V+(1—)V?]
(13)V +[c(] +[1—c(1—
whereR° andarethe expectedlossesin the currentperiod (derived
below).The present value of the loss equa1 the current loss plus P(the
9discount factor) times the expected present value in the next poriod.The
expected present value in the next period is an average ofand V
weighted by the probabilities that current inflation is positive and
non-positive.Ifprevious inflation wasnon-positive, so bothpoiicymakers
target zero, current inflation is positive with probability,the
probability of a positive inflation shock. If previous inflation was positive,
current inflation is non-positive with probability c(1 -),theprobability
that C is in charge and there is no positive shock. (Assumption (6), the
restrictiononthe size of shocks, guarantees that inflationis positive ifL is
in charge.)









isthe expectedlosswhen e is zero and both policymakers target zero.
isthe expected loss when C and L target zero andrespectively.The
secondlinesof the equationsuse (3),(10),and (11).Substituting(14)—(15)
into (12)—(13) leac6 to solutions for V and Vin terms oc ArIderlyirtg
parameters (these complicated expressions areomitted).
D.Deviations
TableI is a perfect Nash equilibrium if neither policymaker can ever
gain by deviating from it.Following the usual practice, I consider a
policymaker's incentive to deviate in a single period given that he behaves
10according toTableI in all other periods.7As discussed above,a policyme.ker
always targetseither zero or his discretionary inflation rate .rd (the
Appendix showsthatthis holds in anydeviationas well as in equilibrium).
Thus deviating from Table I means choosing 4whenthe table dictates zero,
or vice-versa. Policymaker i can deviate when <0 or when r>0.Let t—l— t—1 1
and be the effects of these deviations on the present value of i's
loss;they are given by
(16) [Z(O,7) —Z.(O,O)]+(l— —v?i ,iC,L
(17) [ZL((1_c)t0) —ZL((1_c)?r,7r)]+(1—)[V—V]
(18) —Z,0)]+(1—)(V—V]
where 74isagain givenby (9).For either policyme.ker,there are two
effects ofdeviating when--- ofchoosing74 ratherthan zero.First,
the current loss changes by Z(O,TT)_Z(0,0), which is negative: the economy
benefitsfrom a boom.Secor, with probability 1 -thedeviation moves
the economy to the high inflation regime (with probabilityinflation rises
even if the policymaker does not deviate).If L deviates when -- if,
contrary to Table I, he disinflates --thecurrentlossrises butwith
probability 1 -theeconomy moves to low inflation.If C deviates when
which means not disthflating, there are opposite effects.
Table I is a perfect Nash equilibritin if and are positive for iC,L.
To understand these. conditions, itis usefulto startwiththe relatively
simplecase of q40: the probability of a shock is negligible.(In equilibrium,
this means that once inflation falls to zero it stays there forever.)For this
case, the Appendix establishes that






+ V L l+c
(21) >0iff a > 2(1—c) -2
(Thedenominator in (20) is positive by (8)).According to (19), neither
policymaker ever gains by deviating when inflation is low.(20) and (21) give
natural conditions under which the policymakers do not deviate when
inflation is high.L does not disinflate as long as his cost of inflation,
aL,is not toolarge.Arid C does disinflate as longas ais not too sme.ll.
(The bound on a depends on a,, which determines the inflation rate that L
will eventually choose if C does not disinflate.)
When q is strictly positive, the general conditions for >0 and :>o are
too complicatedto interpret.Numerical calculations show, however, that the
conditionsare qualitativelysimilar to (19)-(21).Consider, for example,
the case of q.1.I assume c=1/4, =3/4 and determine the combinations of
and a.L for which arid are positive.As in the case of q-i'O,
is positive for all a.L and a.Figure1shows when and are
positive. is positive if a.L lies below an upper bound, and ig
positive if a exceeds a lower bound that depends (positively) on aL.8
E.Discussion
In Table I, C's behavior is simple: since he greatly dislikes inflation, he
always targets zero inflation.L's behavior is more complicated.He does not
dislike inflation enough to disinflate, butfor7rthe resists the
temptation to inflate.This behavior results from an asymmetry between rises
and falls in inflation. Equations (16) and (17) imply that a necessary
12condition for L to behave as assumed is
(22)ZL( (l—c),O) —ZL(( l—c),n) >Z)OO) — ZL(O,r)
which always holds.C22 states that the current cost of disinflation exceeds
the gain from surprise inflation —-thatis, a recession raises L's loss by
more than a boom reduces it.This result explains why L accepts inflation
rather than create a recession, but does not inflate to create a boom.
Booms and recessions have asymmetric effects because the 1068 function
(1) is convex in unemployment.Since the Phillips curve is linear, surprise
inflation reduces unemployment by as much as disinflation raises it.But
convexity implies that the fall in unemployment reduces the loss by less than
the increase raises the loss.The convex loss function is realistic.Convexity
means that policymakers prefer constant unemployment at the natural rate to
symmetric fluctuations around the natural rate -—thatpolicymakers would
like to eliminate a symmetric business cycle.9
The asymmetry between booms and recessions would be strengthened by
a natural modification of the model: a non-linear Phillips curve. If the Phillips
curve is steeper at high inflation (the common view), then an unexpected ri8e
in inflation has a smaller effect on unemployment than an equal fall.In this
case, the gain from surprise inflation is smaller than the cost of disinflation
both because the change in unemployment is smaller and because the loss
function is convex.A non—linear Phillips curve is also realistic. The
disinflation of 1979—82 raised unemployment by four percentage points, from
six to ten percent.It is unlikely that an equal rise in inflation would have
reduced unemployment from six to two percent.
Even though the gains from a boom are small, it is perhaps surprising
that L resists the temptation to inflate for J.valuesof a..Intuitively,
13it appears that a very small aL would lead L to accept highinflation for even
a small short r'..n gain.Indeed,Lwould inflate for aL gufficiently smallif
inflationremained high forever.But if L inflates, he iseventually replaced
byC, who creates a costly recession to disinflate.Even if L does not view
inflation as costly per se, he is deterred from creating it by the future cost
of eliminating it.
F.Other Equilibria
This section concludes with a brief discussion of possibleequilibria
besides Table I.There are two issues.First, since Table Iis an equilibrium
only for certain parameter values, I ask whathappens in other cases.
Second, I describe equilibria that coexist with Table I.
Other Parameter Values: Not surprisingly, different ranges of parameter
values imply different equilibria.One noteworthy possibility is presented in
Table II.Here I label the two policymakers liberal (L) and radical (R), and
assume that aL>aR.As in Table I, L prolongs low inflation but does not
disinflate.R always inflates -—thatis,he always sets 'j.Heis so
indifferentto inflation that when inflation is low he raises it to gain a
one-periodboom.Table II can be an equilibrium if a lies in a moderate
rangeand a. isvery small.This equilibrium yields a negative relation
between inflation anduncertainty:if inflationishigh, both policymakers keep
it high, while if inflation is low one policymakerkeeps itlow and the other
inflates.10
This result shows that a positive inflation—uncertainty relation depends
on assumptions about parameter values as well as on the basic model.
However, the conditions for a negative relation -—inparticular, the condition
that aR is very su.li --appeariinrealistic.It is unlikelythat any Fed
chairman would consider inflation so harmless that he would intentionally
14move the economy from low to high inflation.Policymakers disagree about
the response to high inflation, but there is a consensus that low inflation
should be prolonged.
Multiple Equilibria: As in other infinite—horizon models of monetary
policy, there are many perfect Nash equilibria for given parameter values.
This paper will not attempt a full analysis of the multiplicity problem, but
one should note two equilibria that coexist with Table I.First, as usual
there is an equilibriiin in which policykers always target their
discretionary inflation rates, 14. Since policynkers' behavior is constant,
inflation uncertainty is constant.Second, as in Barro—Gordon (1983b) and
Canzoneri, there can be equilibria with finite "punishment periods."When a
shock raises inflation, expected inflation rises but then falls automatically
after one or more periods: disinflation does not require a recession.
(Temporary punishment is sufficient to deter surprise inflation.)If the
punishment period is short aod a is not huge, C accepts high inflation
during the period to avoid the cost of immediate disinflation.L does the
same, so there is little policy uncertainty.11
A reason for focusing on the equilibrium in Table I is realism. In Table
I, changes in actual inflation lead to changes in expected inflation.This
appears consistent with U.S.experience.It is unrealistic to assume that
expected inflation is constant, as in the discretionary equilibrium, and very
unrealistic to assume that it falls automatically after a punishment period.
V.COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY
A.Motivation
The last section assumes that policymakers attach a cost to the level of
inflation.While this assumption is plausible, the subject of the paper
15suggests an alternative.Economists are interested in the inflation—
uncertainty link largely because it helps to ecplain why inflation is costly.
The costs of anticipated inflation, such as deadweight loss from the inflation
tax, appear small.But if inflation causes uncertainty, there may be
significant costs, such as greater risk in long-term nominal arrangements
(Jaffee and Kleiman, 1977; Fischer and Modiguiani, 1978).Motivated by this
view, this section assumes that policymakers' losses depend on uncertainty
about inflation as well as the current level.The effect of the current level
can be small or even zero.
This version of the model raises a new issue.In the previous section,
uncertainty arises from C's efforts to disinflate, along with L's resistance.
C's motivation is his view that inflation is costly.But if the main cost of
inflation is uncertainty, it appears that C creates the cost by trying to
eliminate it!If C simply accepted high inflation, like L, then uncertainty
would diminish. The major cost of inflation would be reduced, and no
recession would be required.Why does C not take this course?
This section contains two results relevant to this issue. First, Table I,
with ita positive inflation—uncertainty relation, can be art equilibrium even
when the model includes a cost of uncertainty. Second, while there is another
equilibrium with high but stable inflation (the discretionary equilibrium), C
may not prefer this equilibrium.As suggested by Fischer and Summers
(1989), reducing the costs of inflation -—inthis case by reducing
uncertainty ——canraise the level of inflation so much that policymakers are
worse off.
B.A Positive Inflation-Uncertainty Relation
Here I add a cost of uncertainty to policymakers' loss functions and
show that the behavior in Table I can remain an equilibrium.Modify the loss
16function, (1), to be
(23)Z. (Ut_U°)2+a.+bEt[rrt+i-
Thisspecification attaches costs to both the current levelof inflation arid the
variance of next period's inflation.The former can be interpreted as
deadweight loss from the inflation tax, and the latteras increased risk in
nominal contracts.One should think of a. as small, so that a.rr2issmall for
moderate inflation rates.
We can deter,ujne when Table I is an equilibrium with the approachof the
last section.itisagain l/(a.+c).(The cost of uncertainty does not
affect L's choice ofbecause uncertainty is the same for all n>O.)
Once again, Table I is an equilibrium if policymakers cannot gain fromany
deviation: A°, >0.Here, policyinakers take account of the degree of
uncertainty implied by positive and non—positive inflation (see (5)).For the
case of q-O, calculations parallel to Section IV show that
(24) &° >0 , i:C,L
(25) >0 iffa.(2—2c—1) +bLc(l_c)<l—fl+flc2
(26) >0 iffafl(l—c2)+afl(1—c)+bc(l_c)(l+a)>
(1_P+Pc)(1+a.L)2—fi(c—c2)
The results for q>0 are again qualitatively similar.
Conditions (24)—(26) are generalizations of (19)—(21), the corresponding
conditions in the basic model.C and L never deviate from Table I when
For ir11>O, they do not deviate as long as their distastes for
inflation are strong and weak enough respectively. Here, policymaker i's
17distaste for inflation is neasured by a linearcombination of a. and b..ote
that if a.'O, (24)—(26) are satisfied for ranges of band b..Thus the
equilibriumin Table Isurvives even if uncertainty is the only cost of
inflation.
As in the basic model, C disinflates because heviews inflation as very
costly.Here this result seems paradoxical, because the major cost of
inflation ——uncertainty-—resultsfrom C's efforts to disinflate.Nonetheless
this situation can be a perfect Nashequilibrium.When inflation is high, the
public expects C to disinflate and L not to disinflate.The resulting
uncertainty has large costs (e.g. there is less investment).Under Nash
behavior, C takes expectations as given, and thus takes it asgiven that high
inflation creates costly uncertainty.He disinflates to move the economy to
the low-inflation regime, in which the public is certain of futurepolicy.
C.Does C Prefer the Discretionary Equilibrium?
As in the basic model, many equilibria can coexist withTable I.In
particular,as long as a.L and aarepositive, there isan equilibriun in
whichpolicyukers always target their discretionary inflation ,IT.
HereI compare C's losses in this equilibrium to his losses in Table I to see
whichequilibrium he prefers.It seems natural to focus on equilibria that
policymakers prefer, and previous authors usually do.A loose but intuitively
appealing justification is that policymakers can guide the economy to a
desired equilibrium, for example through policy announcements.In most
models, policymakers prefer equilibria like Table I, in which inflation isoften
low, to the discretionary equilibrium.In the current model, however, it may
appear that C prefers the discretionary equilibrium, becausehis efforts to
disinflate in Table I create costly uncertainty.This suggests that C will try
to guide the economy to the discretionary equilibrium by publicly forswearing
18disinflation.12
Here I show that this argument need not lead us to reject the
equilibrium in Table I.Even if C can influence ttie selection of an
equilibrium, he may not choose the discretionary one: perhaps surprisingly
his lossesmaybe lower in Table I.To show this,I derive the behavior of
inflationin the discretionaryequilibrium.Equation (9) definegand 7T,
whichthe policymakers target every period, in terms of i.Rational








Onecan show that, since C does not disinflate, the variance of inflation
impliedby (27)-(28) is smaller thanthe variance when -1>0 in Table I.A
useful special case isbC>bLbut aC_aLua:Ccares mere about icertainty,
butthe policymakers attach the same small cost to the inflation level.In
thiscase,both az*1reduce to1/a in the discretionary equilibrium,
and policy uncertainty disappears completely.
Does reduced policy uncertainty mean that C prefers the discretionary
equilibrium?Combining (27)—(28) and the loss function (23) leads to C's
average 1088 per period in the discretionary equilibrium:
—ac(1+a)2+aC(1_c)(l+a,L)2+(b+1)c(1_c)(a_aL)2
(aLac +(1-c)a.L +CSC]
+qa(aC+bC+ 1) + 1
(WhenaC:aLIa, (29) reducesto (1+a)/a +q2(a+b+1).)Onecan
determinewhich equilibrium C prefers by comparing thepresent value of this
19loss to C's losses in Table 1, which arederived with an approach parallel to
Section IVC.13
The relation between C's losses in Table I and inthe discretionary
equilibrium is ambiguous.Rather than present the general conditions for C
to prefer Table I,I illustrate the possibility with two special cases.The
first, which is not surprising, is bb.-O:asin the basic model, the cost of
inflationdepends only on its level.In this case (or for b. close to zero),
one can show that Cprefers Table I because the level of inflation is often
Low.The second case, which is less obvious, is aL a -0.Inthis case,
the expression in (29) approaches infinity.C's losses in Table I'emain
finite,so heprefers that equilibrium.
ThusC prefers Table I not only if the cost of inflationdepends entirely
on the level (b.0), but also if thecost of the level is small(a.-ø0).14The
secondcaseis important because, as discussed bo, smallvalues ofa are
realistic.The explanation for this case is thatsmall aimply very high
inflation targets in thediscretionaryequilibrisn (as aL and a approach
zero, the targets approach infinity).In Table I, by contrast, targets are
alwaysmoderate:evenwhent_1>O the possibility of disinflationholds down
,,e,and hence L'starget(as a.-O,approaches 1/c <as).WhenaLand aare
small,moving from Table I to the discretionary equilibrium raises thelevel of
inflation so much that C is worse off even though there is less uncertainty
and the cost per unit of inflation is small.This result illustrates Fischer
and Summers's (1989) point that trying to reduce the costs of inflation --in
this case by reducing the resulting uncertainty -—canbe counterproductive.
This drawback to the discretionary equilibrium seems realistic.Suppose
that Paul Voicker, hoping to reduce uncertainty, announced in 1979 that he
would accept high inflation permanently rather than disinflate.This might
20have led to very high inflation: as Okun (1971)argues, inflation may rise
considerably if the public believes that the Fed has givenup the fight
against inflation.
VI.CONCLUSION
This paper presents a model in which a rise in inflation raises
uncertainty about future monetary policy, and thus about future inflation.
When inflation is low, there is a consensus that the monetary authoritywill
try to keep it low.When inflation is high, policymakers face a dilemma: they
would like to disinflate, but fear the recession that would result.Since the
public does not know the tastes of future policymakers, it doesnot know
whether disinflation will occur.
Is policy uncertainty an important source of the inflation
level—uncertainty relation in actual economies?In principle, the relation
could arise instead from the reaction of the private economy to high
inflation.Hasbrouck (1979) shows, for example, that high trend inflation can
raise variability by making money demand more responsive to shocks.Ball,
Mankiw, and Romer (1988) argue that high inflation reduces nominal rigidity
and thus steepens the short run Phillips curve; a steeper Phillips curve
implies that inflation varies more as demand fluctuates.Finally, it appears
possible that high inflation destabilizes the relation between the money stock
and the Fed's policy instruments, thereby magnifying monetary control
errors.15
It seems unlikely, however, that these explanations for the
level-uncertainty link are the whole story.The following may be a useful
thought experiment.Suppose that a Constitutional Amendment imposes severe
punishment on any Fed chairman who lets inflation deviate too much from x,
21and that everyone therefore knowsthat the Fed will try to produce x.
Compare inflation uncertainty when xis zero to uncertainty when x is ten
percent.It is possible that money demand or the money multiplieris less
stable when the target is ten percent, and thusthat actual inflation varies
more.But with a firm commitment to the target, the varianceis probably
small in both cases.The important difference between zero and ten percent
inflation in actual economies is not theFed's ability to hit these targets ifit
wants to, but rather the degreeof uncertainty about whether the target will
change.
I conclude by pointing out a limitationof my model.In the model, high
inflation creates uncertainty only aboutdisinflation --aboutwhether inflation
will return to a low level.In actual economies, it appears that highinflation
also creates uncertainty about whetherinflation will rise further.Okun
argues that if the Fed acceptshigh inflation to accomodate a shock, the
public fears that inflation will rise again if there isanother shock.In
contrast, a nonaccornodative policy showsthat the Fed is committed to




Here I show that, as claimed in Sections.IVB and I, a policymaker's
inflationtarget is alwayseither zero or his discretionary level 74.As
explainedinthetext, this resultis trivial if thereis no inflation shock:
sinceall 77>0havethe same effect on future expectations, the policymaker
chooses only the one that minimizes his current loss.With a shock, we must
rule out the possibility that a policyn.ker reduces 77*belowr4toincrease
the chance that ifallsto zero accidentally.In addition, we must ask
whether a policymaker chooses a neZative target rather than zero to reduce
the chance that nrisesabove zero accidentally.I show that a policymaker
always targets zero or 74ifq, the probability of a shock, lies belowa
bowd;this bound defines in (7).
I first ask whether a policymaker prefers a zero target to a negative
target.Ifpolicymaker ichoosesa non-positive target77*ina given period,
thepresent value of his loss is
(Al)W.(,T*)=Z(7e,,Y*)+[pV+(1—p)V?]
where V and V are defined by (12 )-( 13) and p is the probability that
current inflation is positive.16p is given by
(A2)p q(1 —F(—lTt)]
whereF(S)isthe c.d.f. of the inflation shock.In (A2), q is the probability
of a shock and 1_F(1,*) is the probability that the shock is large enough to
produce positive inflation.
23Substituting (A2) into (Al) and differentiatingyields
dW.
(A3) +aqf(_*)(V—V°]
where f()isthe density function oftheshock.For 1T4<O, thisderivativej
greatestat ,1*O, sincedZ/d7r*isincreasing in iandf(t) is greatest at
tO.Thus ifdW./dn* is negative at it is negative for all,r*<O, and
thepolicynker prefers,r*:O to At ,T:O,dZ./d7Tj9_2(,Te+l);
since the lowestife in Table I is zero,dzi/dlT*is no greaterthan -2.Along





(A4)guarantees that the policymaker prefersir:O to ,T*(O.
Inowask whethera policynker prefers1TTr'toanother positive
target.For TT*>O,thepolicyinaker's loss is given by (Al) with
(A5) p (l—q)+q[l_F(_n*))
The probability that inflation is positive is theprobability of no shockplus
theprobability of a shock greater than -.
Assunption(6) implies that -7liesbelow the lower bound on e. Thus
F( _1'T4):O, and p1 forir:n.Alongwith(Al), this implies
(A6)W(i4) Z(e,1)+
Equations(Al)and (A5) define W; for an arbitraryrr)O..Using (A6),one






24(In (A7),I again set to zero, its lowestvalueinTable I,to obtain
the lowest bound.)
If a policymaker prefers zeroto anynegative target and 74toany
otherpositive target, then he chooses either zeroor 74.Thushechooses
zero or74 if (AU is satisfied and (A7) issatisfied for all rr>O.One
can show that both conditions are more restrictive for iC than foriL (the
conservative is more tesiptedtoreduce7Tbelowzeroor Thusboth
conditionshold for both policymakers if
(AS)q <
Z(O,ir) —z (0,nd)
- .1 2 c cc q mini , f(O)[V —VIF(—n)[V —V°]
whereitisthe positive value of itthatminimizes the rightside of (A7).
The shapeofF(•) determinesthevalue of itandwhich of the expressions
insidethe mmis snller.(AS) definesin (7).(The bound on q is defined
implicitly, becauseqaffectsthrough V and V.The bound is satisfied
forq sufficiently sn.1l, becauseresmins strictly positive as q approaches
zero.)
B.The Case of g-'O
HereI outline the derivation of (19)—(21), the conditions for Table Ito


















where, from (B1)—(B2) and(14)—(15),





Using the assumptions thataC>aL azxi c<1 -1/2,one can show that is
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1. Evidence of an inflation-uncertainty link is presented by Okun (1971),
Logue and Willet (1976), Jaffee and Kleimari (1977), and Taylor (1981).While
the evidence is not conclusive (see Engle [19831), it appears to be widely
accepted.In any case, this paper treats the inflation—uncertainty linkas a
fact to be explained. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Devereux (1989)
present other recent explanations; these papers are discussed below.
2. As this example suggests, the model is meant to apply primarily to
moderate—inflation countries like the U.S.The experience of high inflation
countries (e.g. in Latin America) depends largely on factors that I ignore,
such as the use of seignorage to finance budget deficits.
3. It would be realistic to introduce serial correlation in who is in
charge, or to let c depend on the state of the economy.But these
modifications would greatly complicate the analysis.
4. This specification is a simplification of Canzoneri's model. In
Canzoneri, a shock arrives every period.In addition, the inflation shock is
derived by assuming that the Fed chooses the money stock and that money
demand is stochastic.The money demand shock is observable --thepublic
infers it from the money stock and the price level -—butthe Fed has a
forecast of the shock that is private information.Adopting this more
sophisticated approach would not change my main results.
5. The result that inflation remains high until C creates a recession is a
departure from Barro—Gordon and Canzoneri.In those papers, inflation fails
costlessly after a brief "punishment period." This difference is discussed in
Section IVF.
6. If poLicymakers alternate in power according to a Markov process, (8)
can be replaced by the assumption that the transition probabilities are
small.In this case it is not necessary to restrict the unconditional
probability that C is in power.This approach introduces other complications,
however.
7. For a class of repeated games including the one considered here,
Sorin (1988) shows that a set of strategies is a perfect equilibrium if one can
rule out single—period deviations.
8. Cetrus paribus, raising q increases the rnge of parameters
for whichAL>Oaz decreasestherangeforwhich>0.That is, it
makes both policymakers more likely to prolong higii inflation.A large
q makes disinflation less attractive because disinflation is quickly
reversedthrough a positive inflation shock. -
Recallthat ass1nption (7) restricts q to liebelowthe bourxl q.For q
strictly positive, the sufficient condJ.tins for Table I to be an equilibrhn
incliie this restriction as well as A°,A . >0.(q depends on all the
parameters and the density function' foi the inflation shock. Thus, fora
givenq>0, the bound may be satisfied in some cases and notin others.)
299. The asymmetry between rises and falls in unexpected inflationis
discussed by Hoshi (1988).In his model, the asymmetry can lead to multiple
equilibria for the level of inflation.
10. In the equilibrium in Table I, L does not create surprise inflation
even if aL is very small, becauseinflation leads to a recession when C
disinflates.In Table II, Rdoes inflate for small aR because heknowsthat
nobody willdJ.sinflate.
11. For further discussion of these equilibria andothers, see Fischer
(1986) and Rogoff (1987).
12. This idea is informal because there isrio formaltheory ofhow
announcementsmove the economy from one Nash equilibriumto another.
Taylor (1983) argues that the economy is likely toarrive at an equilibrium
thatpolicymakers prefer.Rogoff (1987) expresses doubts.Other authors
often focus on desirable equilibria without providing ajustification.
13. For the results below, it does not matter whether one assumes an
initial state of ort-1>° incalculating the present value of the loss
in Table I.
14. C may prefer the discretionary equilibrium to Table I ifboth a
bc arelarge --thatis,if he stronglydislikes both a high level of
inflation and a high variance.
15.Cukierman andMeltzer (1986) and Devereux (1989) present other
theories of the inflation-uncertainty link.These papers, like the current
one, use models of time—consistent policy inthe Barro-Gordon tradition.In
both papers, an exogenous increase in the variance of a shock, which raises
the variance of inflation, also raises average inflation in the discretionary
equilibrium.In Cukierman-Meltzer, a larger variance of monetary control
errors makes it harder for the public to detect anintentional increase in
inflation.This raises a policymaker's gain from inflating, and thus raises
equilibrium inflation.In Devereux, a higher variance of real shocks reduces
equilibrium wage indexation, which increases the temptation to inflate by
increasing the real effects of inflation surprises.In both models, as in
Hasbrouck and Ball—Marikiw—Romer, inflation varies more around a
policymaker's target when the average target is high.In my model, high
inflation raises uncertainty about whether the target itself will change (see
the discussion below).
16. The aunption that V and v? are given by (12 ) -(13) means that
the policymakers obey Table I in all future periods.That is, as in the text I
consider a single—period deviation from the equilibrium.
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